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MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMPROMISE
SETTLEMENTS
By Joe C. Stephens, Jr.*

T

HE PRINCIPLES controlling the upsetting of compromise
settlements in personal injury cases because of an innocent nonnegligent error in a physician's diagnosis are shrouded by exceedingly chaotic judicial rationalizations. The many factual distinctions and legal theories which may be seized by the judge harassed
by the pitiful pleas of the injured plaintiff and the importunities
of the indignant defendant can hardly be weighed in advance by
the attorney drafting the re!ease or the doctor phrasing his diagnosis.
The claim agent, the lawyer and the physician who deal with personal injury cases must know the state of the local law in order
to follow an effective procedure in settling controversies with finality,
and the public is interested in having rules, as to the avoidance
of releases, which will work substantial justice in the maximum
number of individual cases and will promote the important social
interests at stake.
Scant contact with the law is sufficient to cause the observer
to realize that where medicine or other scientific fields with their
constant search for progress and questioning attitude toward the
past impinge on the law with its ancestor worship the results are
likely to be anamolous if not disastrous. The courts, permeated
with the doctrine of stare decisis, may apply to a new or changing
situation rules gathered from related fields which are closely
analogous legally but in complete contrast factually-judges are
likely to be interested in the symmetry of legal principles while
scientists are concerned primarily with facts.
In the decisions dealing with the rescission of releases for
erroneous statements of a doctor these conflicts are apparent. The
seven league strides of medicine in the last century have not been
matched by the interstitial advances of the law. A little over a
hundred years ago the opinion of the layman as to the nature,
extent and probable course of his injury was approximately as
reliable as a similar opinion of his physician, whereas today, though
medicine may still be a combination of art and science, even the
well-educated layman is at a disadvantage as compared with the
*A.B.; LL.B.; member of the bar, Dallas, Texas; former editor of the
Harvard Law Review; part time instructor in the College of Law, Southern
Methodist University.
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poorest of doctors. Doubtless the law has taken cognizance of
some of the implications of this change, but the cases still abound
with theories that were formulated in the infancy of medicine and
science and cannot be justified in the present state of scientific
knowledge. The lawyer persists in demanding that the rules of
ordinary contracts be applied to releases executed in reliance on
a doctor's diagnosis and decries the logic of that court which decides
a case on the premise, frequently inarticulated, that a release of
a personal injury claim is something different from the sale of a
horse and that a doctor's opinion is more reliable than a horse
trader's evaluation.
The typical case before the court is the plaintiff with, let us
say, a spinal injury, permanent in nature, who after being injured
by the defendant' has made a settlement for $150.00, releasing
the defendant from "all damages, liabilities, etc., accrued or to
accrue, arising out of injuries sustained in an accident occurring
on July 19, 1943" etc. 2 The settlement is made after the plaintiff
is informed by a doctor paid by the defendant that (a) the plaintiff
has sustained only minor bruises or (b) "you'll be all rightready to work in ten days or two weeks." This case has its mutations-the doctor may be more or less closely connected with the
defendant or he may be plaintiff's own family physician. The
statement involved may be pure diagnosis; it may be diagnosis and
prognosis; it may be pure prognosis, and if prognosis alone it
may be a cautiously qualified opinion or a blunt assertion of a flat
date for recovery. The consideration received is normally much
less than the damages sustained although it may vary from a
nominal sum to a substantial amount involving four figures.' The
'In most of the cases the defendant is an insurance company or a large
employer. Whether this indicates that plaintiffs only select eminently solvent
defendants or that most defendants are either insured or of a size to selfinsure by adequate costing procedures is not-capable of ascertainment. Probably 2both factors exercise a selective influence.
See Notes (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1462, 1524; (1938) 117 A. L. R. 1022,
1043. Almost every release is as broad as the attorney can make it, and every
new wrinkle mentioned by the decisions will immediately be incorporated in
next3 year's form books.
Any thorough study of this subject would make at least two statistical
comparisons. One of these would be a ratio of recovery as against a ratio of
non-recovery-the ratio would be the amount of the verdict divided by the
amount of the consideration for the release. The ratio of recovery would be
expected to be much higher than that of non-recovery. The other study
would compare the time interval between the accident and release in recovery
and non-recovery. It is probable that the average time elapsed in the former
would be much less than in the latter. For such a statistical analysis in the
field of mistake in building contracts, see Lubell, Mistake in Construction
Contracts (1932) 16 Minn. L. Rev. 137.
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judge or the jury with their preconceptions must then decide
whether or not the settlement will be sustained. In laying down
rules of law for the guidance of the jury the judge has many tools
at his command; he has the doctrines of misrepresentation and
mistake, which blend together; the whole question can be disposed
of on principles of agency; the matter may be determined by the
distinction between facts and opinion, each with its many exceptions; the materiality of the statement may determine the result;
the case may hinge on the fact that the injured party did not rely
on the erroneous opinion because of independent advice or because
the court believes that the plaintiff has no "right" to rely on the
defendant's doctor. With these many tools to choose from a judge
can write a presentable opinion on either side of ninety-five percent of the cases, and with due respect it seems that many courts
do select those tools best fitted to carve out a result consonant
with the court's notions of equity and justice on the specific set
of facts presented to it.4 If predictability is the chief merit in
law, it is then obtainable only so long as different judges hold the
same notions of fairness.
Reconciling the decisions in the several American judisdictions
is a virtual impossibility, and it is nearly as difficult to find rational
continuity even in the decisions of the courts of one jurisdiction.
By way of apology to the judges for the foregoing statement, the
reason for such diversity of decision becomes readily apparent to
any person who attempts to formulate rules as to what the law
should be even in that ideal jurisdiction, the realm of the law
review articles.
In a modest effort to indicate a possible reorientation of the
decisions dealing with the rescission of compromise settlements 5
the writer must follow certain definite steps. It is relevant to
review briefly the history of the law of deceit and misrepresentation. And it is desirable to discuss the differences between an
action of deceit and the equitable remedy of rescission as well as
to note some factual differences between rescission of a contract
4

Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
Judicial Decision (1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 274. The fair judge need only
acquire the right hunch, but the good judge must get the right hunch and
write a good supporting opinion. The dangerous judge is the humorless one
who 5believes there is only one foreordained answer.
Any hope of guiding such a reorientation is pure vanity. Courts will
not note an obscure article, and, if they do, claim agents will continue their
practices because they can make a dozen uncontested settlements tainted
with the same error for which a court avoids one settlement. The odds are

obvious.
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of sale and avoidance of a release in personal injury matters. Some
writers have even contended that it is desirable to review the
decisions of the courts in the field being discussed-solely for the
sake of conventionality this article makes some such attempt.
Finally, since the law is a living thing and is supposedly designed
to settle actual controversies and to minimize potential controversies
in our complex civilization, it is thought worthwhile to mention a
few of the factors that might influence the decisions of a court
which does not consider itself irretrievably bound by its precedents.
It is then for the courts to evaluate the truly relevant factors and
select those that are worthy of legal consideration.
I
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF DECEIT

While this paper is devoted solely to an analysis of suits for
rescission of releases in personal injury cases, it is necessary to
understand the history of actions at law for deceit in which an
affirmative liability is sought to be imposed upon the defendant
for his misrepresentations, since the courts often fail to distinguish
cases imposing such affirmative liability from cases of rescission
which impose no liability but only leave the parties where they
were prior to the transaction. Actions at law for deceit include
cases enforcing liability against misrepresentors who are not bound
to the plaintiff by any contractual obligations, while by definition
rescission of a release or contract is a remedy available only between parties who have undertaken contractual relationships. The
distinction between these remedies and the difference of treatment
which is demanded by such distinctions will be discussed laterhowever, it will be seen that the tendency of the law is toward
wider relief in both instances.
In the latter part of the 19th century the Court of Appeals
crystallized the English law of deceit by the decision in the leading case of Derry v. Peek.6 This case has been extremely influential in the United States although a number of states have refused
to follow it and many others have paid lip service to it while
actually disregarding it through various fictions. The court in
Derry v. Peek required as a basis for an action of deceit that there
be either conscious misrepresentation of a material existing fact
or wanton and willful disregard of the truth of the representation.
The facts of that case seem to have presented at least wanton dis6(1899) 14 App. Cas. 337.
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regard of the truth, yet the Court of Appeals held the misrepresentor not liable.
Criticism of this decision was almost immediate. The difficulty
of proving an actual intent to tell an untruth is practically insuperable. Since the average defendant is loath to admit on the stand
that he was a consummate liar at the time of the questionable
transaction, to prove fraud the evidence adduced must by extrinsic
facts show not only the untruth but that the defendant niust have
been aware of such untruth. It is true that Derry v. Peek was
probably in line wtih the morality of contemporary America, then
in the heyday of free enterprise and Black Fridays. Only three
years before that decision the first ineffectual Interstate Commerce
Act was forced on a reluctant Congress by the agrarian protestants
of the West. In view of the unwillingness of the courts at this time
to hamper industry in its "legitimate" pursuits, it is amazing that
there was no greater unanimity among American jurisdictions in
adopting the rule. The answer to its rejection in many states may
have been the growing Populist revolt.
A line of distinguished commentators has discussed liability
for the use of language, negligent, fraudulent or innocent. Jeremiah
Smith, the initial professorial critic, approached the matter gingerly.7 He advocated liability for negligent misrepresentation in
certain cases but limited this liability by a number of strict requirements." Furthermore, his article is permeated with the apologetic theme that the novelty of such an action should be no bar
to its adoption. Even as Professor Smith was writing the tide of
public opinion was changing; the muckrakers were in vogue, and
Ida Tarbell and Lincoln Steffens ruled the roost on McClure's
Magazine. Legal thought was shifting from the acceptance of caveat
emptor and protection of the seller of the gold brick to caveat vendor
and a wide extension of the law of warranty. The strict rule in
actions of deceit could hardly be maintained inviolate in the face
of the changing morality and a new attitude toward business dealings which was to bring forth the Pure Food and Drug Act and
the Federal Trade Commission.
7Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14 Harv. L. Rev.
184; 8see also Note (1900) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 66.
1d. at 195. The requisites would be (1) defendant volunteered a statement to plaintiff, (2) the statement was untrue, (3) defendant, though
believing the statement, had no reasonable ground for such belief, (4)
defendant intended that plaintiff should act on the statement, (5) the subject
of the statement was such that substantial pecuniary loss could be expected
if untrue, (6) plaintiff reasonably relied on the statement, and (7) to his
damage.
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These cross currents of thought affected both the courts and
the commentators and the next major criticism, an article by Professor Williston,9 was no longer apologetic for an action on negligent
misrepresentation but assumed that in theory it should be completely acceptable as a basis for liability. He argued further that
under certain circumstances non-negligent innocent misrepresentations should create liability in an action on the case, which would
practically absorb the law of deceit since any calculating litigant
would be foolish to attempt to prove conscious misrepresentation
when a suit proving innocent error would be just as effectual. 10
His thesis is that, since the courts do impose liability for innocent
misrepresentations in many situations (such as warranties and in
instances where the facts justify an estoppel or where the misrepresentor occupies a position of intimate knowledge), then the
requirement of conscious mistatement in deceit or even negligent
misrepresentation is entirely illogical, destroying the vaunted symmetry of the law. If his theory of liability for innocent misrepresentation were accepted, Williston would limit it to misrepresentations made in a business transaction or where the misrepresentor
expects to gain from the actions induced by his statements. Obviously
any thoughtful analyst would hesitate to predicate liability on every
misrepresentation in view of the possibility of unexpected damage
arising from mere casual conversation.
Professor Bohlen contributed to the thought in this field in
an article entitled "Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or
Warranty"'" dividing the cases which have rejected Derry v. Peek
into those based on negligent misrepresentation and those on innocent misrepresentation. While it seems that Bohlen prefers negligent misrepresentation as a creator of liability because of the
familiarity of the courts with the technique of negligence actions,
his main thesis is that the courts should distinguish the action of
deceit from an action on the case for negligence. He wishes to
eliminate the fictions through which judges, though enunciating
strict rules of deceit, yet manage to hold individuals for innocent or
negligent misrepresentation so that they will use special defenses
which should be applicable to the latter situations. His conclusion
9
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 Harv. L.
Rev. 415. Professor Williston has repeated these ideas in his treatise,
acknowledging the existence of later articles without being affected by them.
5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) § 1486-1534, in particular § 1510.
19This ignores possible differences in measure of damages and a few
unusual situations where deceit would still be the only available remedy.

11(1929) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 733.
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is that the courts should recognize an action for negligent use of
language or, if they choose to impose liability for innocent nonnegligent misrepresentation through some analogy to warranty,
then the law of warranty should be expanded to include cases
where privity of contract is lacking. He is open-minded as to the
rules to be applied but demands that the courts re-examine the
bases of liability.
Bohlen's discussion was followed immediately by two interesting articles in the Illinois Law Reuiew.1 2 Professor Carpenter
seems to think that legal consistency per se is no virtue, thus taking
issue with Professor Williston. He believes that there is room in
the law for an action of deceit for conscious misrepresentation, for
an action for negligent misrepresentation in certain instances and
for other doctrines such as defamation, estoppel in pais, and warranty. Professor Weisiger agrees with Professor Carpenter in
feeling that each situation is entitled to its special rule; but he
would realign the doctrines, imposing liability for conscious dishonesty, liability for negligent misrepresentation, or absolute liability
for innocent misrepresentation depending upon the relative social
weight to be attached to each interest involved. Abstractly, of
course, this theory is ideal and is no doubt the over-all aim of the
law but as a solution of particular cases it leaves the average judge
or litigant somewhat at sea.
0
Dean Leon Green analyzes these questions in an interesting
article 3 which became a chapter of his book "Judge and Jury."
He dissects the cases of deceit and examines the resulting portions
microscopically. His conclusion is that there are so many formulas
and sub-formulas that the trial court has a wide range of choice.
His theory is summed up in his own words:
"But the point to be stressed here is that whatever sort of judgment is desired the formulas which have been evolved and their
coteries of attendant phrases provide the most flexible accommodation without in the
least impairing their own integrity or that of the
14
judicial process."
A careful analysis of the cases in this and other fields certainly
indicates that many courts do determine the result first and then
12Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation (1930) 24 Ill.
L. Rev. 749; Weisiger, Bases of Liability for
Misrepresentation (1930) 24 Ill.
L. Rev. 866.
3
' Green, Deceit (1930) 16 Va. L. Rev. 749.
14d. at 770. The quotation continues: "A science of law could ask
little better by way of intellectual machinery for handling these varied and
difficult cases." This may be true as to a "science of law" but how many
judges have time to be legal scientists?
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work out a theory to support the holding. It has been mentioned
that in ninety-five percent of the cases where a release is attacked
due to an erroneous statement by a doctor an excellent opinion can
be written for either side of the case without disturbing the findings
of fact. Whether such decision by visceral reaction or hunch can
be indulged without impairment of judicial integrity is, indeed,
another matter. It may be urged that this flexibility has the effect
of permitting the courts to weigh the social interests involved as
advocated by Professor Weisiger, but such a weighing process is
likely to be inaccurate unless it is consciously adverted to, which
is rarely the case, since a majority of judges probably believe that
they are applying immutable heaven-sent rules, although their
personal predilections are the actual deciding factors in the judicial
process.1 5
A recent article16 by Harper and McNeely in the Minnesota
Law Review contains an excellent summary of the preceding articles
and classifies the factual situations encountered in misrepresentation cases into four categories depending upon the degree of reliance
which is justified in the particular case.17 These categories are,
of course, generalizations and, if they are accepted and the courts
are willing to shift particular statements from one category to
another when the mores and social needs change and when the
reliability of a certain type of representation varies, then such a
theory is entirely acceptable, but, considering the proclivities of
the courts for stratification of decision based on stare decisis, we
may be permitted to have some doubt as to the workability of the
theory, even though it is an excellent tool for the analysis of decisions.
15Subsequent to Green's article there was an -interesting interchange
of blasts between Dean Green and Professor Bohlen. Bohilen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated As Negligence or Fraud (1932) 18
Va. L. Rev. 703; Green, Innocent Misrepresentation (1932) 19 Va. L. Rev.
242. Probably the chief point of issue between Green and Bohlen related to
the advisability of achieving legal results through fictions. However, the
neutral bystander may wonder how anyone could found liability on innocent
misrepresentation when two such learned gentlemen could each argue so
vehemently that the other "innocently" misrepresented his carefully worded
article.
' 6 Harper and McNeely, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresentation
(1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 939.
17Id. at 943-945. The four categories are (a) no reliance justified as in
the case of puffing, (b) only reliance justified is on the honesty and sincerity
of the other party, (c) where honesty plus reasonable care and competence
may be expected and (d) where absolute assumption that the facts are true

is justified.

MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS

II
DECEIT VERSUS REscissioN; CONTRACTS OF SALE
VERSUS RELEASES

The foregoing articles are concerned chiefly with the imposition
of liability at law for the use of negligent language and proceed on
the theory that rescission in equity is a horse of another color, assuming that rescission will uniformly be granted for innocent nonnegligent misrepresentation.' 8 Analysis of rescission of releases
for misrepresentation will indicate that many courts do not observe
this difference, applying deceit formulas to cases of rescission.
Nevertheless, despite the abolition of the forms of action and the
blending of law and equity the distinction between a suit for rescission and an action of deceit has a firm factual basis. Assume that
B is negligently injured in the employ of A Co. B is examined
by M, A Co's. medical man, who innocently and carefully tells B
that he has sprained some muscles in his back and will be well in
a week. B in reliance on this settles with A Co. for $100.00 and
executes a general release. As a matter of fact, one of B's vertebrae
is smashed and he will be permanently incapacitated. If on one
theory or another we avoid or rescind the release and permit B to
bring an action against A Co., we have simply returned the parties
to their original position and are reimposing on A Co. a liability
which the law has felt should be imposed as a matter of policy. If,
however, we permit B to recover against M for his non-negligent
innocent assertion we are imposing an entirely new liability. Such
a liability may shock our sense of fairness. But if M has knowingly
or carelessly misinformed B, our sense of fairness may not be
shocked by this "punishment" of a "bad" or "careless" man. Certainly whatever liability is imposed on A Co. has been expected
from the day of the injury and when we can restore it to the status
quo, there is no justification in permitting it .to retain the fruits of
M's misrepresentation, however innocent, whereas any liability on
M is new and unexpected.' 9 Thus there is ample logic back of a
rule permitting rescission for innocent misrepresentation while
185 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) § 1500. Green, Fraud, Undue
Influence and Mental Incompetency (1943) 43 Col. L. Rev. 176, 178.
19The illustration, "positing an affirmative liability against the doctor, is
controversial. If an affirmative action against A Co. were permitted the net
result would probably be the same as rescission since privity of contract
existed. Where the liability is contractual the chief difference would be the
measure of damages and possible defenses. Williston, supra note 8, at 440
attaches very little importance to the measure of damages used in an action
for misrepresentation.
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requiring fraud or negligence for an affirmative action of deceit,
even though many courts do not recognize the validity of the distinction.
The primary interest of the commentators has been the liability
for deceit in sales or other business transactions. Such situations
are dearly distinguishable factually from the settlement and release of personal injury claims. It may be said that the injured
party is selling his claim to the tortfeasor, and no doubt in some
instances he is doing just that and the parties are dealing at arm's
length, each sparring warily, looking for an opening. But one may
contend that there is a distinction without being called a sentimentalist. The law does profess to be more concerned with invasions of personal than property rights. More often than not the
injured party is floored by the calamity, doctor's bills are mounting,
his pay check is shrinking, and the bills come in on the first of the
month without fail (provided credit is still obtainable). There is
vital pressure to obtain cash for immediate needs. As a contrast
the tortfeasor ordinarily can afford to wait since his income remains unimpaired and he knows that the time required for adjudication favors the defendant. Disastrous economic compulsion
squeezes the injured party, and this compulsion is a legitimate
factor for judicial consideration; it is clear that, however much the
courts may profess to abhor principles based solely on ability to
pay, it is nevertheless the prime mover behind many rules of law.
Such compelling needs often lead to a hasty release without any
taint of "undue influence" in the legal sense of the word. When
to compulsion is added the assurance of a qualified physician that
the injured party will be well within a short period, the obvious
answer is settlement. If settlements of personal injury suits do not
differ from the sale of a horse, there is justification for applying
the same rules to each situation, but if the pattern is consistently
different (despite those few instances which deviate from the
normal), then there is adequate justification for different treatment
in each type of case. Although the courts do not usually flatly state
that the ordinary principles of contract law-are inapplicable to releases of personal injury claims, a substantial number of jurisdictions do apply special rules to such releases and in so doing
recognize these distinctions.

20

20
Bakamus v. Albert, (1939) 1 Wash. (2d) 241, 95 P. (2d) 767. At 770
the court said, "It has often been held that a demand of which a party was
ignorant at the time of the execution of the release, was not embraced within
its term. This is particularly true in cases of a physical injury existing at the
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Furthermore, rescission in sales cases is a more drastic remedy
than rescission of a release in personal injury claims because the
"reliance interest" is greater. Due to the rapid changes of price
and general business conditions even rescission of most business
contracts is likely to have consequences extending beyond the
particular sale and affecting the collateral business life of the parties
whereas rescission of a personal injury release is unlikely to have
any effect except the reimposition of an original liability, whose
consequences could not have been avoided except for the release.
III
DEFINITION OF MISTAKE AND MISREPRESENTATION

Before examining the cases dealing with the problems of misrepresentation and mistake as possible grounds for the avoidance
of a personal injury release it is well to define, our terms. The following definition of innocent misrepresentation seems as satisfactory as any:
"If the mistake of one party is induced by the other with neither
knowledge of the error nor willful indifference in regard to it there
if
is misrepresentation but not fraud. And there is simply mistake
2
the erroneous belief was not induced by the other party." '
From this quotation it is implicit that fraud is a misrepresentation where the representor is either conscious of the error or is
willfully indifferent to its truth or falsity.2 2 This definition does
not state what misrepresentations or mistakes will have legal effect,
and several elements must be added to the misinformation to make
it actionable. For instance, it is usually said that for relief to be
granted for mistake it must be material and in reference to a matter
of fact, not to mention that some courts refuse to give any relief
for innocent misrepresentation.
time of the giving of the release, but then unknown to the parties, especially
if such an injury be of so serious a character as to indicate that if it had been
known, the release would not have been executed." The court in a realty
matter then applied a substantially different rule from that enunciated as
applying to personal injury cases.
225 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) § 1487. Restatement, Contracts
(1932) § 470 reads as follows:
(1) "Misrepresentation in the Restatement of this Subject means any
manifestation by words or other conduct by one person to another that,
under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accord with the
facts."
And § 500:
"In the Restatement of this Subject, mistake means a state of mind
that is not in accord with the facts."
Accord, Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 6 and § 8, Comment b.
22Cf. Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 471 and Restatement, Restitution
(1937) § 8.
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One of the principal elements of confusion concerning the rules
governing the avoidance of releases arises directly out of these definitions. If D's doctor, M, erroneously diagnoses P's injury, then
in a jurisdiction accepting the rule that innocent misrepresentation
will vitiate a release, P need only prove the error, his reliance on
the representation and connect M with D. In a jurisdiction rejecting
relief for innocent misrepresentation, however, the same misrepresentation may be viewed as a mistake since it induces a state of
mind not in accord with the facts. If M gives P and D erroneous
information, omitting therefrom an unsuspected injury, P and D
are laboring under a mutual mistake no matter whose doctor M is.
Whether or not that mistake is grounds for relief depends on the
rules governing that subject. For mistake there seems to be no
logical requirement that M be D's doctor-he may be an independent doctor or even P's family physician; in any event P and
D both are mistaken as to a fact material to the settlement. Therefore, even in a jurisdiction granting relief for innocent misrepresentation it may be prudent for P to seek relief for mistake if
he cannot connect M with D (such connection is by definition an
integral element of misrepresentation) provided that the remaining
elements of actionable mistake are present.
Because of this overlapping of mistake and misrepresentation the
decisions frequently do not characterize the error as either mistake
or misrepresentation. 23 Such treatment doubtless makes for
loose thinking, but it may lead to substantial justice in many instances. This confusion is so prevalent and the decisions are so
chaotic that the only practical analysis of the cases is by a breakdown into fact situations.
Unless it is felt that releases of personal injury claims are a
special field, justifying treatment different from that applied to
mercantile contracts, many of the cases simply cannot be explained.
In almost every case cited in this article the release involved was
general in form, specifying that P released D from all liability
arising from injuries sustained in a certain accident including "all
damages, liabilities, etc., of whatsoever nature, whether now accrued or to accrue." Such a release is obviously intended by D
and his attorney to cover all injuries arising out of the accident,
whether such injuries are known or unknown.14 If D's doctor
23

Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 1462, 1464.
1t is probable that in most cases the settlement itself was based solely
on a discussion of known injuries and the estimated time of recovery. The
release, however, includes all injuries, and, if there is no fraud in the execu24

MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS
actually makes a consciously erroneous statement intended to induce settlement, it is submitted that all courts would give relief
bottomed on fraud. However, litigants can rarely prove such fraud,
but, even so, there is no difficulty in obtaining relief from those
courts which agree with the commentators in granting rescission
for innocent misrepresentation. But what can a court do whose
25
precedents deny relief for innocent misrepresentation, and what
can any court do when the doctor is either independent of both
parties or is responsible only to P?
The crux of the difficulty is the general release. If the doctor
is independent or the court does not permit rescission for innocent
misrepresentation, how can a mistake as to the extent of the injuries be grounds for relief in the face of a clause specifically covering all injuries, known and unknown? If a release is simply an
ordinary contract, and the claimant is selling his claim (and one
26
wherein lies the
court has definitely said that is the situation)
mistake? Of course, the parties by definition did not know of the
"unknown" injury, but they have contracted to settle for such
unknown injuries, and on the principles of contract law it was a
risk adverted to and paid for, and there could be no relief.
tion, the parol evidence rule prevents the court from considering the original
settlement-at least no case has been found consciously evading that rule.
No doubt most claimants who are unrepresented by counsel do not realize the
full import of the general release and still think they are settling only for
existing injuries and the probable effects thereof. On the other hand it is
also certain that most releases (or their attorneys) understand fully the
import of the general release and realize that they are "buying complete
peace." Therefore, if mistake exists it is unilateral, being solely on the part
of the claimant. And it is a set rule of law that relief will be denied for
unilateral mistake. See Notes (1926) 26 Col. L. Rev. 989; (1927) 27 Col.
L. Rev. 60; Lubell, Mistake in Construction Contracts (1932) 16 Minn. L.
Rev. 137. This rule of law is of course not foreordained and relief would
logically be given under the now-discarded theory of contracts based on
"meeting of the minds." 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) § 1535;
McClintock, Mistake and the Contractual Interests (1944) 28 Minn. L.
Rev. 460.
25While a party cannot contract against his own fraud, it is theoretically
possible to contract against liability for innocent misrepresentation. 5 Williston,
Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) § 1511. Yet such clauses are rarely included in
releases, though provisions that the releasor relied on no representation of
any person are frequently encountered and about as frequently vitiatcd by
the courts on some theory of mistake or are simply ignored. See Texas & P.
Co. v. Presley, (Comm. App. 1941) 137 Tex. 232, 152 S. W. (2d) 1105.
Ry. 26
1n dealing with rescission of a personal injury settlement the court
in Kane v. Chester Traction Co., 186 Pa. 145, 40 Atl. 320 (1898) said: "If
plaintiff had been a merchant selling goods, and the defendant a purchaser
delireciating their value in the dicker, we could not say that the latter had
exceeded the license allowed him by the standard of commercial honesty, and
there is no reason to hold the present parties to any stricter rule." It is thought
that the date of this case is significant. Accord Vondera v. Chapman, (1944)
352 Mo. 1034, 180 S. W. (2d) 704. But see Backamus v. Albert, (1939) 1
Wash. (2d) 241, 95 P. (2d) 767, supra note 20.
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Two recent cases have pointed up this problem neatly. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts2 7 refused relief where P,
having sustained a fracture of the femur and bruises of the leg due
to D's negligence, was after treatment advised by her doctor that
she had fully recovered. The doctor also informed D of this and a
settlement was made. Two months later osteomyelitis developed in
the injured leg. The court refused relief for this mistake, dpenying
it unless there was fraud or concealment. The court was not of the
opinion that this error as to the extent of the injury or of the fact
of recovery was a mistake in view of the general release. On basic
contract principles the logic of this case is hard to refute. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota was faced by a similar situation but
granted relief in the face of a powerful dissent. 2 The facts in
Larson v. Sventek indicate that the doctor's report omitted any
mention of an existing brain injury. P and D evidently settled on
the basis of this report of an independent physician, P executing
a general release. The majority followed the Minnesota decisions
which give relief for mistake or misrepresentation as to existing
unknown injuries holding that it was for the jury to decide whether
the parties intended to compromise unknown injuries no matter
how broad the language. Judge Stone, dissenting, criticizes the
holding as deviating from the usual contract rule, though recognizing the precedents within Minnesota, saying, "Neither is it denied
that there are many cases, .some of which are cited by the majority,
which in result lend support to the decision. It is respectfully submitted that there is no occasion to analyze them until someone at
least makes an effort, by resort to the reason of the problem, to
show that the usual principles and controls of contract law are for
some reason, so far unexplained, inapplicable." "Quite inadvertently, this decision applies to releases from liability for personal injuries a rule we do not apply in similar cases from other torts or
breach of contract. There is being created an exception which in
reason has no basis. The error results from failure to appreciate
that a release is a contract, in the making of which the parties
exercise unlimited contractual competence.1 29

Stone thus aligns

himself with the Massachusetts court despite contrary Minnesota
precedent. Doubtless his logic is irrefutable if "the parties exercise
unlimited contractual competence" and if a release is to be judged
by the rules of ordinary contracts. And yet on some theory or
27
Tewksbury
28

v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc., (Mass. 1946) 65 N.E. (2d) 918.
Larson v. Sventek, (1941) 211 Minn. 385, 1 N. W. (2d) 608.
29(1941) 211 Minn. 385, 1 N W. (2d) 608, 611.
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another the majority of jurisdictions do grant relief, even for mistake, despite the fact that some of these courts must be aware of
the deviation from ordinary contract principles, and it is submitted
that the facts of the situation support those courts granting relief.
However, a number of courts find themselves torn between the
two logics, that of the symmetry of legal principles and that of
the inescapable factual differences.
Even though the courts frequently disregard a general release,
still it is effective enough that practically all releases are general
in character, and, unless otherwise mentioned in this paper, it will
be assumed that the release is as broad in covering all injuries,
claims and liabilities arising out of the accident as legal ingenuity
can make it. If the release presents even the shadow of a doubt as
to its breadth, the courts will construe it as covering only known
injuries; thus where the release is general in terms but specifies
particular injuries the court, using the rule of thumb that the
specific governs the general, will interpret the release as valid but
as intended to cover only the specified injuriesY' In such a case
the suit is based on the original negligence but recovery may be had
only for damages resulting from the unspecified or unknown injuries.
Occasionally the entire issue is sidestepped by requiring the plaintiff
to return the consideration received for the settlement as a condition
precedent to bringing suit 3' although most courts consider this re3OTexas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Dashiell, (1905) 198 U. S. 521, 25
Sup. Ct. 737, 49 L. Ed. 1150; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Artist, (C. C. A. 8, 1894)
60 Fed. 365, 23 L. R. A. 581; Lumley v. Wabash R. Co., (C. C. A. 6, 1896)
76 Fed. 66; Gold Hunter Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bowden, (C. C. A. 9,
1918) 252 Fed. 388; Beddingfield v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., (1915)
110 Miss. 311, 70 So. 402; see Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. & Light
Co., (1908) 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383; contra Quebe v. Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co., (1904) 98 Tex. 6, 81 S.W. 20. The theory of these cases is more
unexceptionable than the usual rescission of a general release, but it is hard
to see that the mistake is any different in such cases-specifying the injury
only makes proof that there were unknown injuries simpler. It may be noted
that these cases were early ones-attorneys learn quickly. Sometimes it is
impossible to learn enough, as witness the plaintive cry of counsel in Nygard
v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 109, 179 N. W. 642, 643, "Appellant's counsel expressed a desire to have the court advise how a release
may be framed that will not be open to attack on the ground of mutual
mistake, if the one in question is not. If fraud or mutual mistake has induced
the making of an unconscionable contract, courts ought to be more concerned about granting relief, than desirous of clinching future wrongs by
making such contracts incontestable."
'-Hubbard's Adm'x. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1937) 267 Ky. 435, 102
S. W. (2d) 343; Smallwood v. Ky. & West Va. Power Co., (1944) 297 Ky.
202, 179 S.W. (2d) 877; Och v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., (1895) 130 Mo.
27, 31 S.W. 962; Stewart v. Steinoff, (Mo. App. 1938) 119 S.W. (2d) 76;
Gilbert v. Rothschild, (1939) 280 N. Y. 66, 19 N. E. (2d) 785, 134 A. L. R. 1;
Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Bryan, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 101 S.W.
(2d) 895.
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quirement so onerous that they evade it by various expedients such
as deduction of the consideration from the amount of the judgment 2
-practically speakifig it is often impossible for the claimant to
restore the consideration which has long since been spent on medical
and living expenses. Of course, any rule requiring tender prior to
rescission has the effect of placing an additional economic hurdle
in the claimant's path.
IV
RULES INVOLVED

It is clear that all jurisdictions will grant rescission of a release
of a personal injury claim where the defendant's doctor consciously
misrepresented the extent of plaintiff's injuries and plaintiff relied
on that misrepresentation in making the settlement. 3 This statement is an application of the usual principles governing the rescission of simple contracts. The rarity with which such true fraud
can be proved probably explains the paucity of decision in some
states. Probably most states in which no decisions have been
found can be placed in this category along with those specifically
adhering to the rule. Some states which originally accepted fraud
as the only ground of relief have switched to more liberal rules.3 4
Any jurisdiction which will rescind for innocent misrepresentation
(and probably all mistake jurisdictions) would a fortiori grant relief in these circumstances. No theorist could quarrel with relief for
fraud, but almost all would object to limiting relief so narrowly.
Where this rule obtains it makes little difference if the statement
was of fact or"opinion since if the fraud exists it is actionable even
though opinion."
32
Peterson v. A. Guthrie & Co., (W. D. Wash. 1933) 3 F. Supp. 136; Texas
Employers Ins. Assn. v. Kennedy, (Comm. App. 1940) 135 Tex. 483, 143
S. W. (2d) 583. Tender was not required in about one-third of the cases
cited in this article. See also Haigh v. White Way Laundry Co., (1914) 164
Iowa 3143, 145 N. W. 473; Note (1941) 134 A. L. R. 6.
8 Haigh v. White Way Laundry Co., (1914) 164 Iowa 143, 145 N. W.
473; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Goodholm, (1900) 61 Kan. 758, 60 Pac. 1066;
Loveless v. Cunard Mining Co., (Mo. App. 1918) 201 S. W. 375; Carlson
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1928) 82 Mont. 559, 268 Pac. 549; Hardy v. Manchester St. Ry., (1913) 77 N. H. 21, 86 Atl. 257; Pass v. McClaren Rubber
Co., (1929) 198 N. C. 123, 150 S. E. 709 (expressly denying relief unless
there was fraud) ; Ward v. Heath, (1943) 222 N. C. 470, 24 S. E. (2d) 5;
St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Reed, (1913) 37 Okla. 350, 132 Pac. 355; Beatrice
Creamery Co. v. Goldman, (1935) 175 Okla. 300, 52 P. (2d) 1033; Chicago,
R. I.34& P. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, (1918) 71 Okla. 118, 175 Pac. 494.
The only state, cases from which are mentioned in note 33, supra, not
having
at least one more liberal case is North Carolina.
3
5Lumley v. Wabash R. Co., (C. C. A. 6, 1896) 76 Fed. 66; Yeager v.
St. Joseph Lead Co., (1929) 223 Mo. App. 245, 12 S. W. (2d) 520; Oestreich
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., (1918) 140 Minn. 280, 167 N. W. 1032.
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Any practicing attorney realizes that it is almost as difficult to
prove that a doctor has been negligent as to prove actual fraud.
Nevertheless a few cases have been found where negligent misrepresentations have been the basis of relief. 36 These cases may
be only one aspect of the fraud rule since actionable fraud is frequently defined as a misrepresentation whose untruth the misrepresentor knew or should have known. To call the latter fraud in the
lay sense is obviously fictional, and it seems preferable to characterize it as negligence. However, in reading most of the decisions
granting relief in such cases one feels that actual fraud existed
but was impossible of proof under the circumstances; for that
reason denominating such cases as fraud may not be as fictional
as supposed.
The leading state granting relief in cases of innocent misrepresentation by defendant's doctor but denying it for mistake where
there is a general release is Texas.37 This position seems to be that
accepted as the correct rule by the commentators 38 although the
2GSt. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Richards, (1909) 23 Okla. 256, 102 Pac.
92, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032; Ballenger v. Southern Ry. Co., (1916) 106
S. C. 200, 90 S. E. 1019. Minnesota grants relief for innocent misrepresentation of fact but denies relief where the statement of the doctor is only
a prediction; yet Minnesota granted rescission under such circumstances
where the prediction was negligently made. Kjerkerud v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 325, 181 N. W. 843. South Carolina
is the only one of these jurisdictions in which no case going beyond negligent
misrepresentation has been found.
3
7Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Maples, (Dallas Civ. App. 1913) 162
S. W. 426; Missouri, K. &T. Ry. Co. v. Haven, (Texarkana Civ. App. 1917)
200 S. W. 1152; Reasoner v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1918) 109 Tex. 204,
203 S.W. 592; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Thomas, (Texarkana Civ.
App. 1922) 244 S.W. 839; El Paso Electric Co. v. Cowan, (El Paso Civ.
App. 1924) 257 S.W. 941, aff'd (Comm. App. 1925) 271 S.W. 79; Texas
& P. Ry. Co. v. Presley, (Comm. App. 1941) 137 Tex. 232, 152 S.W. (2d)
1105. Contra Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. McCarty, (1901) 94 Tex. 298, 60
S. W. 429; Jones v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1903) 32 Tex. Civ. App. 198,
73 S.W. 1082; Quebe v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1904) 98 Tex. 6, 81 S.W.
20; El Paso & Southwestern Co. v. Kramer, (El Paso Civ. App. 1911) 141
S. W. 122. The foregoing cases cited as contra lay down a fraud test-note
that they are all early cases and the Texas rule appears to have changed.
The only recent case denying relief for innocent misrepresentation is Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Neal, (Eastland Civ. App. 1938) 119 S.W.
(2d) 1077. Texas is supposed not to require scienter even in an action for
deceit. Miller, Innocent Misrepresentation as the Basis of an Action for
Deceit (1928) 6 Tex. L. Rev. 151. Texas denies relief for mutual mistake in
the face of a general release. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Johnston, (Comm.
App. 1934) 123 Tex. 592, 72 S.W. (2d) 583; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Hilton, (Comm. App. 1935) 126 Tex. 497, 87 S.W. (2d) 1081.
385 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed 1937) § 1500, 1551. Williston admits
the possibility of mistake in respect to unknown injuries despite a general
release, though he thinks that usually on interpretation of the instrument it
should cover all injuries. To the writer of this article it seems difficult to
imagine such a mistake (other than unilateral) with a general release. The
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hardship on the plaintiff is of similar magnitude whether the error
is called mistake or misrepresentation. Assume that P has released
his claim for $100, relying on D's doctor's statement that he has
only a wrist injury whereas he also has a fractured pelvic boneis there any merit in distinguishing that case from a similar report
by a doctor independent of both plaintiff and defendant. Actually
P may rely more implicitly on such independent advice than he
does on D's doctor. The chief factual justification for distinguishing the two situations rests on a possible inference of fraud if the
doctor is D's agent or employee. If relief for innocent misrepresentation by defendant (or his doctor) is granted because of the
hardship in requiring plaintiff to prove fraud or negligence, then
a distinction between the two is justified. The cynical observer
can hardly be censured for feeling that where the defendant's
doctor makes a misstatement, though the proof shows innocence,
there may be something more involved than meets the eye-this
very feeling may be one justification of the wide extension of the
law of warranty in modem days. And analogies with the law of
warranty are certainly persuasive that innocent misrepresentation
should be ground for rescission of a settlement for personal injuries.
In addition to Texas which specifically denies relief for mistake
it is possible that some courts which grant relief under the name
mistake are actually doing so on the ground of innocent misrepresentation-this would seem to be the solution of those cases which
grant relief for mistake so lung as the doctor is the defendants but
refuse to do so where the doctor is independent or hired by the
plaintiff.3 9 In order to prove actionable misrepresentation it is
necessary that in some way the doctor be connected with the defendant-in theory there should be relief only where the doctor is
an employee or agent of the defendant, 40 but the cases seem to
construction of the release is perfectly clear though relief might still be
granted as a matter of policy despite the obvious language. Furthermore,
mistake as an equitable doctrine may not be capable of exact definition.
Moffett, Hodgkins & Clarke Co. v. Rochester, (C. C. A. 2, 1898) 91 Fed.
28 at 35, "The word 'mistake' is of so broad a character, and includes so many
varied circumstances, that rules which undertake to define what a court of
equity can do or cannot do in regard to correction of a mistake, either unilateral
or mutual, seem to me to confuse rather than to enlighten."
89
Sitchon v. American Export Lines, (C. C A. 2, 1940) 113 F. (2d)
830, cert. den. (1940) 311 U. S. 705; Toland v. Uvalde Const. Co., (1939)
198 Ark. 172, 127 S. W. (2d) 814; Douda v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
(1909) 141 Iowa 82, 119 N. W. 272.
4
oRestatement, Contracts (1932) § 477. If a third person has made the
material misrepresentation, the transaction may be avoided until the other
person'has given value or materially changed his position-from that the
question arises whether ridiculously low compensation should be considered
as true "value" in such instances.
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extend the connection to any doctor whose bill is paid by the
defendant or go further and accept some broad equitable principle
evidently refusing to allow the defendant to accept the fruits of
the misrepresentation at the same time he denies responsibility for
it.41 This equitable principle can easily be extended to the point
where the court under the name
of misrepresentation is actually
42
giving relief for mutual mistake.
Although any attempt to categorize the decisions is probably
futile, the next observable line of decisions are those denying relief
for innocent misrepresentation but granting it for mistake. 43 The
cases abound with statements like "if Doctor Jones (defendant's
physician) made these statements fraudulently, then the release can
be upset for misrepresentation, while if the statements were innocently made, there has been a mutual mistake justifying rescission."14 4 Doubtless if such jurisdictions refuse relief where the
physician is independent, then in fact relief is really being granted
simply for innocent misrepresentation under another name, probably
due to the court's feeling that its precedents forbid relief for misrepresentation unless there was actual fraud. However, some
41
The Texas Commission of Appeals seems to tend toward a more
liberal rule. Cowan v. El Paso Electric Ry. Co., (Comm. App. 1925) 271
S. W. 79; Graves v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., (Comm. App.
1942) 138 Tex. 589, 161 S. W. (2d) 464. The earlier cases and the lower
courts are thoroughly confused. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Huyett, (1906)
99 Tex. 630, 92 S.W. 454; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haven, (Texarkana
Civ. App. 1917) 200 S.W. 1152; Great American Indemnity Co. v. Blakey,
(San Antonio Civ. App. 1937) 107 S.W. (2d) 1002; Gibson v. Employers
Liability Assurance Corporation, (Texarkana Civ. App. 1939) 131 S.W.
(2d) 327; Lipscomb v. Houston Electric Co., (Galveston Civ. App. 1941)
149 S.W. (2d) 1042, (dictum that the doctor must have been authorized to
settle 2the claim).
Pattison v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co., (1909) 55 Wash. 625, 104 Pac. 825.
43
Gieat Northern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, (C. C. A. 9, 1905) 136 Fed. 118;
Steele v. Erie R. Co., (W. D. N. Y. 1930) 54 F. (2d) 688, aff'd (C. C. A.
2, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 690; Reddington v. Blue & Raferty, (1914) 168 Iowa 34,
149 N. W. 933; Landau v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, (1st Dept. 1932) 237
App. Div. 141, 260 N. Y. S.561; (See as tending toward a more strict rule in
New York, Barry v. Lewis, (4th Dept. 1940) 259 App. Div. 496, 20 N. Y. S.
(2d) 88; Yehle v. New York Cent. R. Co., (4th Dept. 1943) 267 App. Div.
301, 46 N. Y. S. (2d) 5 ) ; K. C. Motor Co. v. Miller, (1939) 185 Okla. 84,
90 P. (2d) 433 (no doctor) ; Borzor v. Alan Wood Steel Co., (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1938) 130 Pa. St. 182, 196 Atl. 532; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Humphrey, (1934) 167 Tenn. 421, 70 S.W. (2d) 361; Schmidtke v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., (1940) 236 Wis. 283, 294 N. W. 828; see Note
(1942)4 17 Wis. L. Rev. 401.
- Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Albritton, (C. C. A. 8, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 280;
Matthews v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1942) 54 Cal. App. (2d) 549,
129 P. (2d) 435; Wolf v. Cudahy Packing Co., (1919) 105 Kan. 317, 182
Pac. 395; Mancini v. Pennsylvania Rubber Co., (1942) 147 Pa. Super. 359,
24 A. (2d) 151.
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courts maintain their logical consistency to the extent of granting
relief if the doctor is independent or plaintiff's physician. 45
Some jurisdictions, notably Minnesota, 6 recognize both innocent misrepresentation and mistake as grounds for rescission of
a release of personal injury claims.4 7 The distinction between the
two can then be logically drawn on the relation between the doctor
making the statements and the defendant. This rule is certainly the
most comprehensive possible and is designed to effectuate substantial
justice in the greatest number of cases, but it has not gone without
criticism even by members of its own court as the dissent in Larson
v. Sventek indicates. However, that criticism is principally aimed
at relief for mistake where the doctor is independent and the release is general in terms, and probably Stone, J., would not object
to relief for innocent misrepresentation by defendant's doctor, if
the same rule obtains in ordinary contract cases.4 8 This comprehensive position permits the courts to give relief for mistake where
proof of the doctor's agency is lacking, but it encounters the logical
difficulty of upsetting a general release covering all injuries simply
because there was a mistake as to the extent of the injuries.
In addition to the foregoing rules there are some miscellaneous
doctrines based on the consideration received by the injured
claimant. Naturally the fact that a desperately injured party re45

Robert Hind, Ltd. v. Silva, (C. C. A. 9, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 74; South-

west Pump & Machinery Co. v. Jones, (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 879;

Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, (C. C. A. 10, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 377; McCarthy
v. Eddings, (1942) 109 Colo. 526, 127 P. (2d) 883; Jordan v. Brady Transfer
& Storage Co., (1939) 226 Iowa 137, 284 N. W. 73; Dominicis v. U. S.
Casualty Co., (3d Dept. 1909) 132 App. Div. 553, 116 N. Y. S. 975; Le
Francois v. Hobart College, (Sup. Ct. Ontario 1941) 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 200,
aff'd,46 (1941) 287 N. Y. 638, 39 N. E. (2d) 271.
The following cases are misrepresentation cases: Jacobson v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co, (1916) 132 Minn. 181, 156 N. W. 251, L. R. A. 1916D
144; Vineseck v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 96, 161 N. W.
494; Althoff v. Torrison, (1918) 140 Minn. 8, 167 N. W. 119; Bingham v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 316, 181 N. W. 845. The
following cases are mistake cases: Mix v. Downing, (1929) 176 Minn. 156,
222 N. W. 913, (1930) 179 Minn. 351, 229 N. W. 319; Serr v. Biwabik
Concrete Aggregate Co., (1938) 202 Minn. 165, 278 N. W. 355, 117 A. L. R.
1009. No relief will be granted for unilateral mistake. Hanson v. Northern
States
4 Power Co., (1936) 198 Minn. 24, 268 N. W. 642.
TAtchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Peterson, (1928) 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac.
406; Tatmati v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., (1913) 10 Del. Ch. 105, 85
Ati. 716; Bailey v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., (1918) 72 Ind. App.
84, 121 N. E. 128; Crane Co. v. Newman, (1941) 111 Ind. App. 273, 37 N. E.
(2d) 732; Clark v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1917) 36 N. D. 503, 162 N. W.
406, L. R. A. 1917E. 399.
4sStone's objections might extend to innocent misrepresentation if (a)
it has not generally been a ground for rescission of other types of contracts
or (b) if the release expressly provided against innocent misrepresentation
as a basis for avoidance.
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ceived a paltry sum for executing a release would have some effect
on any court, but, unless the consideration is legally inadequate,
the small amount is not alone grounds for rescission. 49 Two cases
give some indication that a greatly disproportionate consideration
alone may be grounds for rescission,50 but they are probably freaks
which would not be followed in their own jurisdictions except in
special circumstances. There are many decisions to the effect that
a very small consideration is some evidence of fraud,51 and it may
also indicate that the extent of the injuries was actually unknown. 5
Furthermore there are cases where no one factor would justify
a release but the totality of factors plus the pitifully tiny consideration leads the courts to grant relief for what might be termed
"imposition in general" for want of some better phrase.55 On the
other hand where the consideration is large and seems adequately
compensatory a court is likely to search for a rule that will deny
relief. 54 The Kansas court seems to have seized on the frequent
references to the inadequacy of the consideration to announce as
its rule that mutual mistake as to the extent of the injuries plus
grossly inadequate consideration justifies relief.55 As a matter of
fact this inadequacy exists in such a large proportion of the cases
that Kansas by adding this requirement as to consideration has
probably not actually changed the usual rule, or it may be that
the court is only commenting on the small consideration as evidence that the extent of the injuries was actually unknown. It is
49Morris v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., (1919) 23 Ga. App. 554, 99 S. E.
133; Carlson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1928) 82 Mont. 559, 268 Pac. 549;
Pass v. McClaren Rubber Co., (1929) 198 N. C. 123, 150 S. E. 709; Quebe
v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1904) 98 Tex. 6, 81 S. W. 20; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Thomas, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 244 S. W. 839.
5°Russell v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., (1902) 109 Tenn. 43, 70 S. W. 1;
Cf. Ross
v. Koenig, (1942) 129 Conn. 403, 28 A. (2d) 875.
5
1E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Kelly, (C. C. A. 4, 1918) 252 Fed.
523; Atkinson Paving Co. v. Edwards, (1936) 192 Ark. 961, 96 S. W. (2d)
954; Parrott v. Atchison, T. & S. W. Ry. Co., (1922) 111 Kan. 375, 207
Pac. 777; Collins v. Hughes & Riddle, (1938) 134 Neb. 380, 278 N. W. 888;
McMahan
v. Carolina Spruce Co., (1920) 180 N. C. 636, 105 S. E. 439.
52
2Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, (C. C. A. 10, 1942) 127 F. (2d)
32; Parrott v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1922) 111 Kan. 375, 207 Pac.
777; Mattson v. Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Co., (1914) 79 Wash.
266, 140 Pac. 377.
-Bedser v. Horton 'Motor Lines, (C. C. A. 4, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 406;
Owens v. Norwood-White Coal Co., (1919) 188 Iowa 1092, 174 N. W. 851.
Many of the other cases cited present several hardship factors, and it is
difficult to tell how many of these factors could be removed and still obtain
rescission.
5
Tewksbury v. Fellsway Laundry, Inc., (Mass. 1946) 65 N. E. (2d) 918;
LaRosa v. Union Pac. R. Co., (1942) 142 Neb. 290, 5 N. W. (2d) 891.
55Bidnick v. Armour & Co., (1923) 113 Kan. 277, 214 Pac. 808; Koshka
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (1923) 114 Kan. 126, 217 Pac. 293.
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probable that under other circumstances the Kansas court might
rephrase its rule.56
V
NATURE OF THE INJURIES
Once the major principles have been developed the courts then
have various subsidiary decisions to make. It is unanimously stated
that relief will be granted under the appropriate formula where
there are existing (at the time of the release) unknown injuries,
but will be refused where there is error as to consequences of a
known injury.57 So the release will be upset if the doctor tells
the plaintiff that his injuries consist only of a cut wrist whereas he
has also an injured shoulder which eventuates in loss of an arm,
but not if the doctor states that the wrist has been cut and later an
infection sets in due to which a gangrenous condition develops and
the plaintiff loses an arm. In the case of the unexpected development of a known injury the obvious solution is that at the time
of the release there was no' mistake or misrepresentation- the
doctor's statement was true unless he went further and fixed a date
of recovery. On the other hand there are innumerable borderline
decisions really relating primarily to the question of seriousness.5 s
56Smith v. Kansas City, (1918) 102 Kans. 518, 171 Pac. 9; Wolf v.
Cudahy Packing Co., (1919) 105 Kan. 317, 182 Pac. 395; Parrott v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1922) 111 Kan. 375, 207 Pac. 777; Crawn v. Fowler
Packing Co., (1922) 111 Kan. 573, 207 Pac. 793; Rider v. Kansas City
Terminal Ry. Co., (1923) 112 Kan. 765, 212 Pac. 678. All the foregoing
cases presented problems as to the amount of compensation, but did not
enunciate the rule as mutual mistake plus inadequate consideration.
57Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Reid, (C. C. A. 9, 1917) 245 Fed. 86; Hume
v. Moore-McCormack Lines, (C. C. A. 2, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 336; Ladd v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., (1916) 97 Kan. 543, 155 Pac. 943; Althoff v.
Torrison, (1918) 140 Minn. 8, 167 N. W. 119; Richardson v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. Ry. Co., (1924) 157 Minn. 474, 196 N. W. 643; Dolgner v. Dayton
Co., (1931) 182 Minn. 588, 235 N. W. 275; Yocum v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.
Co., (1933) 189 Minn. 397, 249 N. W. 672; Serr. v. Biwabik Concrete Aggregate Co., (1938) 202 Minn. 165, 278 N. W. 355; Landu v. Hertz Drivurself
Stations, (1st Dept. 1932) 237 App. Div. 141, 260 N. Y. S. 561; Mack v.
Albee Press, Inc., (1st Dept. 1942) 263 App. Div. 275, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 231;
Petersen
v. Kemper, (S. D. 1945) 18 N. W. (2d) 294.
58
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, (C. C. A. 9, 1905) 136 Fed. 118,
cert. den. (1905) 197 U. S. 624 (mistake as to "nature of wounds," relief) ;
Robert Hind, Ltd. v. Silva, (C. C. A. 9, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 74 (injury thought
ended but recurred, relief) ; Tatman v. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co., (1913)
10 Del. Ch. 105, 85 Atl. 716 (1913) (known eye injury, depth of penetration
unknown, relief) ; Weathers v. Kansas City Bridge Co., (1917) 99 Kan. 632,
162 Pac. 957 ("extent" of injuries unknown, relief) ; Mix v. Downing, (1929)
176 Minn. 156, 222 N. W. 913, (1930) 179 Minn 351, 229 N. W. 319 (thought
a bruise, actually broken bone, relief) ; Blair v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., (1886)
89 Mo. 383, 1 S. W. 350; Roti v. New England Road Machinery Co., (1928)
83 N. W. 232, 140 Atl. 587 (bruise actually deep muscular injury, relief);
Spangler v. Kartzmark, (1936) 121 N. J. Eq. 64, 187 Atl. 770 (bruise actually
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It may be postulated that if a panel of physicians were given the
basic rule it would ileach results varying substantially from those
reached by law courts, but it is also probable that a group of
physicians assembled in 1916 might disagree with a similar group
assembled in 1946. These doubtful cases put great power into the
bands of the court, and it is likely that in such cases a judge who
believes relief is justified on the facts will decide that the injury
was an existing unknown injury whereas if he is of the opposite
opinion a contrary decision will be reached. In any one case it is
difficult to quarrel with the result obtained, although it would be
impossible to reconcile all of the decisions.
VI
FACT AND OPINION

The fine line between opinion and fact is so largely a matter of
individual taste59 that the courts have great latitude in influencing
the result of litigation by simply designating a certain statement as
fact or opinion. This is possible because the courts have unanimously
stated that for relief for misrepresentation or mistake the erroneous
assertion must relate to an existing fact and not opinion6 0 In the
solution of concrete problems it is of little help for the commentator
to explain that, philosophically speaking, it may be impossible to
denominate anything as fact since each phenomenon must be viewed
subjectively, for the courts are dealing with concrete cases under
deep muscular injury, no relief) ;Harveyv.Georgia, (Sup. Ct.Tompkins, 1933)
148 Misc. 633, 266 N. Y. S. 168 (epilepsy from known laceration of scalp, relief) ; Ruby v. Hutchison, (1944) 154 Pa. Super. 456, 36 A. (2d) 244 (dislocated sacroiliac later found separated, relief) ; Schmidtke v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., (1940) 236 Wis. 283, 294 N. W. 828 (bruise known but
deep injury to blood vessels unknown, relief).
0
M
For a recent discussion of opinion in reference to misrepresentation
see Keeton, Fraud: Misrepresentations of Opinion, (1937) 21 MINNESOTA LAW
REvIr-w 643; also Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," (1937) 4 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 233.
Restatement, Contracts (1932) § 474
"A manifestation that the person making has no reason to expect to
be understood as more than an expression of his opinion, though made also
with the intent or expectation stated in § 471, is not fraud or a material
misrepresentation, unless made by
(a) one who has or purports to have expert knowledge of the matter, or
(b) one whose manifestation is an intentional misrepresentation and
varies so far from the truth that no reasonable man in his position
could have such an opinion."
The view taken by the Restatement is probably a declaration of the existing
law, but the cases often ignore various aspects of the rule without analysis.
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an existing rule with long historical antecedents, and they must
decide what "fact" is from the precedents at hand.8'
A frequently quoted early English case in analyzing whether
there could be a misrepresentation of intent said "The state of a
man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion."8 2 A
doctor may be skeptical of both parts of that proposition. Actually
even the simplest diagnosis is an opinion, and it is well known that
such a diagnosis may be erroneous despite the greatest competence
on the part of the physician and the widest use of clinical tests.
Rarely, however, does a court call true diagnosis opinion.63 And
if any court aid label diagnosis opinion is should add that the
opinion of an expert or a person with special knowledge is as actionable as a statement of fact.
But the results are quite different where prognosis, and not
diagnosis, is involved. Actually competent physicians know that
ventures into prognosis are highly uncertain. The human body is
something more than a combination of basic elements, and for
purposes of diagnosis and prognosis medical science still reveals
its artistic aspects. For this reason physicians usually qualify their
opinions adequately, if only for the sake of their reputations. Presumably a properly qualified opinion even without a statement as
to diagnosis should not be misrepresentation not because it is
opinion but because it is not erroneous in fact. 4 If a doctor says
"you should in the normal course of events be well in three months,
but some of these injuries heal more slowly and some are permanent"
then there is no error if the patient falls within the excepted categories provided that the diagnosis was correct in the first place;
that is, if the injury was such that the diagnosis should have been
that ninety-nine percent of these cases are permanently incapacitated, then there has been error in the original diagnosis and that
error should be denominated as one of fact if any diagnosis is fact.65
clRestatement, Contracts (1932) § 474, Comment a, mentioning the
converse of the text, that every "statement of opinion is a statement of fact,
namely that the person making the statement holds that opinion." Comment
c says
62 that the distinction to be drawn is between "knowledge" and "opinion."
Edgington v. Fitzmaurice. (1885) 29 Ch. Div. 459.
63But see Wingfield v. Wabash R. Co., (1914) 257 Mo. 347, 166 S.W.
1037; Culvern v. Kurn, (Mo. 1946) 193 S. W. (2d) 602; Eccles v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co., (1891) 7 Utah 335, 26 Pac. 924.
14Cf. Colorado Springs & I. Ry. Co. v. Huntling, (1919)
66 Colo. 515,
181 Pac. 129; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, (1901) 63 Kan. 781,
66 Pac. 1018; Harp v. Red Star Milling Co., (1926) 121 Kan. 451, 247
Pac. 65856.
The court in Pattison v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co., (1909) 55 Wash.
625, 104 Pac. 825, says that where a doctor makes an unqualified assertion
as to time of recovery, it will be sufficient, if erroneous, to upset a release.
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Whether it is actionable by reason of reliance or materiality is
another matter.
To the average patient an involved polysyllabic diagnosis is
not half so informative as a statement of the time of probable recovery. It is easy to comprehend and evaluate a statement predicting recovery in two months-probably the average man doesn't
think that the time stated is an infallible prediction, but he does
rely on recovery within some calculable deviation from the date
predicted. 6 Furthermore, the most important element in estimating
the damages sustained by a personal injury claimant is the duration of the injury. The other factor that influences his decision
is the knowledge that he will eventually recover. Certainly the
most reliable evidence the layman can obtain about his injuries is
the statement of his doctor, whether it be straight diagnosis or
unadulterated prognosis.
Probably in view of the fact that a doctor is an expert and that
both diagnosis and prognosis are opinion, the rationale of the decisions defining prognosis as opinion or non-actionable is not that
it is simply opinion, but that it is a prediction as to future events.
After all it is well recognized that while statements of opinion by
laymen are not usually a proper basis for an action for misrepresentation, an opinion by an expert is frequently actionable. 67 There
is no reason why this special exception recognizing an expert's
opinion as actionable should not be carried over into the field of
prediction."8 The commentators are agreed that the reason for
the opinion rule is that such expert opinion is entitled to inspire
reliance; it is the type of statement that governs all our actions in
respect to specialized fields. 9 In the realm of medicine a prediction
as to duration of injury by a physician is entitled to reliance (and
reasonable people govern their affairs accordingly) and should be
actionable at least in cases where rescission is the desired remedy.
Doubtless a great deal depends on the length of time specified
by the doctor as well as the conditions attached to the length of
time. If a physician lightly says: "You'll be up and around in a
66
"To tell a layman who has been injured that he will be about again in
a short time is to do more than prophesy about his recovery. No doubt it is
a forecast, but it is ordinarily more than a forecast; it is an assurance as to

his present condition, and so understood." Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corporation,
(C. C. A. 2, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 942, 945.
7
6 Restatement, Contracts (1932)

§ 474, supra Note 60.

135
Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) § 1496.
6
9Prosser on Torts (1941) 754-767 in specifying the reason for the

expert exception to the opinion rule states that the parties are not on an

equal footing and therefore the individualistic basis for the common law rule
has been destroyed.
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week" the patient has every reason to rely on that statement. On
the other hand, if "two years" is substituted for "a week" the added
time may be said to render reliance must less justifiable. The
reliability may be.said to vary inversely to the time specified. And
yet if any weight is given to the existence of economic compulsion,
the measure of economic pressure probably varies directly with
the length of the period specified. The patient who is told he will
recover in a week can "sweat it out," while the man facing two
years' disability badly needs the money to be obtained from a settlement. Of course, the patient whose injuries turn out to be permanent or of much greater duration than predicted is likely to be
inadequately compensated in either event.
Every prediction as to time of recovery should be based on a
diagnosis of present condition or as it is sometimes phrased the
opinion (prediction) implies a certain state of facts-actually this
is true of every prediction no matter how long the duration of
time. If the underlying facts are not as implied, then relief should
be granted on ordinary principles of misrepresentation or mistake
of fact. The only difficulty with such a solution is that the particular underlying facts may not be readily apparent and there is
little way to prove them. Therefore, if there is great discrepancy
between the predicted duration and the actual duration there is
argument for relief on the ground that the implied facts must
have differed greatly from the actual facts provided it is shown
that the condition of the claimant was such that normally a greater
duration should have been expected. This rule would require of
doctors a high degree of care in giving opinions but one of the
objects of decisions in this field is to secure for the plaintiff reasonable protection and so great care is desirable. The scrupulous
defendant can protect himself by demanding that his settlements
be made only upon the diagnosis of a competent physician and that
any prognosis be in the conditional form considered standard by
better physicians and surgeons; further the defendant can protect himself against fraudulent plaintiffs by having his doctor
render a written opinion which is signed by the plaintiff.70 The
suggested rule would certainly give relief for predictions as -to
duration of injury which are made in such unqualified form and
with such inadequate diagnosis that want of due care seems apparent and actual fraud may be suspected.
The courts have rarely attempted to explain the rationale of
70For specific suggestions as to protective measures which may be
undertaken by the defendant see Note (1942) 17 Wis. L. Rev. 401. The best
device is to train claim agents and adjusters in proper procedures.
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the decisions, but have usually 'simply labelled the offending
statement as fact or opinion and passed on to dearer fields. Normally
little attention is paid to the reason back of denying relief for
statements of opinion or prediction, which is whether reliance on
such statements is reasonable; and most cases do not discuss the
relation of the expert to opinion or prediction and whether reliance
on such opinion or prediction is justified because made by an
expert. 72 In general, predictions that recovery will occur in a short
period of time are held to be "fact" on the basis that the prediction
implies an existing factual condition-holding them to be "fact,"
of course,, only means thit the court considers them actionable. 72
Relief as to prophecies of a longer period for recovery are generally
denied although they, too, imply certain existing facts.7 3 There
are, of course, many cases holding such predictions, even as to
short convalescence, not actionable,7 but in either event it may be
T1
Bailey v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., (1918) 72 Ind. App. 84,
121 N. E. 128; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.v. Haven, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)
200 S. W. 1152; Duncan v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assn., (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) 105 S. W. (2d) 403; VialIet v. Consolidated Ry. & Power Co., (1906)
30 Utah 260, 84 Pac. 496; Brown v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporatiod, (1913) 153 Wis. 196, 140 N. W. 1112.
7Shook v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (C.C. A. 5, 1902) 115 Fed. 57; Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, (C. C. A. 9,1905) 136 Fed. 118, cert. den.
(1905) 197 U. S. 624 (two weeks); Gold Hunter Mining & Smelting Co. v.
Bowden, (C. C. A. 9, 1918) 252 Fed. .388..(three weeks) ;'Steele v. "Erie R.
Co., (W. D. N. Y. 1930) 54 F. (2d) 688, aff'd. (C. C. A. 2, 1931) 54 F. (2d)
690 (two weeks); Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, (C..C. A. 10, 1939) 107 F.
(2d) 377 (Injuries slight, six weeks); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Peterson, (1928) 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 406 (thirty days) ; Indiana Steel & Wire
Co. v. Studes, (1918) 187 Ind. 469, 119 N. E. 2 (six to eight weeks) ; Jacobson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1916) 132 Minn. 181, 156 N. W. 251,
L. R. A. 1916D 144 (three to four weeks) ; Smith v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
(1918) 139 Minn. 343, 166 N. W. 350 (two weeks); Dominicis v. U. S.
Casualty Co., ('3d Dept. 1909) 132 App. Div. 553, 116 N. Y. S.975 (going to
be all right) ; Ft. Worth & R. G. Ry. -Co. v. Pickens, ".(Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
153 S. W. (2d) 252, rev'd on other grounds (Comm. App. 1942) 162 S.W.
(2d) 691 (two to three weeks) ; Viallet v. Consolidated Ry. & Power Co.,
(1906) 30 Utah 260, 84 Pac. 496; Pierce v. Seattle Electric Co., (1914)
78 Wash. 167, 138 Pac. 666.
73Relief denied. Fitzpatrick v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1913)
121"Minn. 370, 141 N. W. 485 (six months) ; Conklin v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
(1932) 331 Mo. 734, 55 S.W. (2d) 306 (four months); Pass v. McLaren
Rubber Co., (1929) 198 N. C. 123, 150 S.WV. 709 (eight to ten weeks). Relief
granted. Reasoner v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co., (1918) 109 Tex. 204, 203
S. W. 592 (two months); Duncan v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assn., (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937) 105 S.W. (2d) 403 (sixty days) ; Brown v. Ocean Accident
& Guarantee Corporation, (1913) 153 Wis. 196, 140 N. W. 1112 (five months).
74AIabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Turnbull, (1894) 71 Miss. 1029, 16 So. 346
(two -or three weeks) ; Homuth v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., (1895) 129
Mo. 629, 31 S. W. 903 (two wveeks) ; Macklin v. Fogel Copst. Co., (1930)
326 Mo. 38, 31 S.W. (2d) 14; LaRosa v. Union'Pac. Ry. Co., (1942) 142
Neb. 290, 5 N. W. (2d) 891 (going to be all right, note large compensation) ;
Chicago. R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Perkins, (1925) 115 Okla. 233, 242 Pac. 535;
Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. AVWatkins, (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) 90 S.W.
(2d) 622 (two to four weeks).
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felt that the courts choose a label proper to support their holdings
which are based on their instinctive reaction to the entire factual
situation.
The only significant departure from this pattern is the rule
adopted by the courts of Arkansas which hold that where defendant's doctor states that an injury is of - limited duration
whereas it turns out to be permanent the release will be rescinded."
The predicted period justifying relief in one instance was nine
or ten months, long enough that most courts would be unwilling
to grant rescission. While the rule enunciated may be unusual
it is difficult to criticize the result. The claimants undoubtedly
relied on the doctor's prediction in making the settlement, and the
compensation received was generally inadequate with respect to
the injuries.78 It hardly offends our sense of justice to see a defendant, who was originally liable and would have been required
to bear the burden except f6r the release, forced to pay full damages
where the release was obtained through the claimant's erroneous
belief that his convalescence would be of limited duration. Probably
a properly conditioned opinion by the doctors could have saved
these releases, but such a conditional opinion might well have entailed larger compensation -at-the time of the release itself. The
Arkansas rule also has the effect of discarding the distinction
between existing unknown injuries and the development or -seriousness of a known injury.
VII
RELIANCE

The relation. of the doctor to the parties is obviously significant
in any jurisdiction giving relief only for misrepresentation, for,
by definition, to be misrepresentation the error must have been
5
7 St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Hambright, (1913)
87 Ark. 614, 113
S. V. 803 (four months, rule not mentioned); St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co.
v. Morgan, (1914) 115 Ark. 529, 171 S. X. 1187 (rule enunciated); Griffin
v. St. Louis, I. 2\. & S. Ry. Co., (1915) 121 Ark. 433, 181 S. W. 278 (few
days) ; Kiecli Mfg. Co. v. James, (1924) 164 Ark. 137, 261 S. W. 24 (four
to five months) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Hedge, (1927) 173 Ark. 729, 293 S. W. 9;
Standard Oil Co. Y. Gill, (1927) 174 Ark. 1180, 297 S. W. 1020; Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Elvins, (1928) 176 Ark. 737, 4 S. W. (2d) 528 (thirty days);
Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Sanford, (1930) 182 Ark. 484, 31 S. W.
(2d) 963; Phoenix Utility Co. v. Smith, (1932) 185 Ark. 553, 48 S. W. (2d)
238 (three months) ; MXissouri Pac. R. Co. v. Treece, (1933) 188 Ark. 68, 64
S. W. (2d) 561 (nini to ten months); Ozan Graysonia Lumber Co. v. Ward,
(1934) 188 Ark. 557. 66 S. XV. (2d) 1074 (will get well).
,"The compensation received loomed large in the later cases. Missouri
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Robinson, (1935) 191 Ark. 428, 86 S. V. (2d) 913;
Atkinson Paving Co. v. Edwards, (1936) 192 Ark. 961, 96 S. W. (2d) 954.
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induced by the defendant. The cases of rescission have become
more liberal in attributing the misrepresentation to the defendant,
evidently accepting some theory that the defendant can't take the
fruits of the misstatement while denying his responsibility therefor 7 -- actually complete acceptance of this doctrine in its widest
application would lead a court to give relief for mistake under
the name of misrepresentation, but no court seems to have gone
this far.
A doctor may occupy a number of different positions; he
may (1) act as claim agent for the defendant, (2) be employed in
defendant's company hospital, (3) be the regular doctor of an
insurance company or large employer, (4) be the regular doctor
to treat the few injuries of defendant's employees, (5) be paid by
the defendant for treatment of the plaintiff's injuries alone, (6) be
defendant's doctor as in the first five situations and also the plaintiff's family physician, (7) be independent of both parties or (8) the
plaintiff's doctor. In the first five cases the tendency is to hold
the defendant liable for his misstatements if the other ingredients
for relief are present.7 8 And in the last three instances there are
cases where the release is rescinded on the ground of mutual mistake if both parties are informed of the doctor's report.79 Of course,
77
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Callahan, (C. C. A. 10, 1942) 127 F.
(2d) 32 (opinion through third person).
78(1) Gulf, C. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Huyett, (1906) 99 Tex. 630, 92 S. W.
454 (no relief as doctor not an agent for settlement) ; Lipscomb v. Houston
Electric Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) 149 S. W. (2d) 1042 (same); (2) Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Haven, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 200 S. W.
1152; (3) Fitzpatrick v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1913) 121 Minn.
370, 141 N. W. 485; Ft. Worth & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Pickens, (Tex. Civ. App.
1941) 153 S. W. (2d) 252, rev'd on other grounds, (Comm. App. 1942) 162
S. W. (2d) 691; (4) Sun Oil Co. v. Hedge, (1927) 173 Ark. 729, 293 S. W.
9; (5) Indiana Steel & Wire Co. v. Studes, (1918) 187 Ind. 469, 119 N. E.
2; Crane Co. v. Newman, (1941) 111 Ind. App. 273, 37 N. E. (2d) 732;
Pattison v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry. Co., (1909) 55 Wash. 625, 104 Pac. 825.
Some few cases require that the doctor have knowledge of a prospective
settlement in order to make his statements the basis of rescission. Jacobson
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1916) 132 Minn. 181, 156 N. W. 251,
L. R. A. 1916D 144; Cowan v. El Paso Electric Ry. Co., (Tex. Comm. App.
1925) 271 S. W. 79; Great American Indemnity Co. v. Blakey, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 1002.
"0(6) Tatman v. Philadelphia, V. & W. R. Co., (1913) 10 Del. Ch. 105,
85 Ati. 716; Parrott v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1922) 111 Kan. 375,
207 Pac. 777; Ruby v. Hutchison, (1944) 154 Pa. Super, 456, 36 A. (2d) 244;
(7) McCarthy v. Eddings, (1942) 109 Colo. 526, 127 P. (2d) 883; (8) Scheer
v. Rockne Motors Corporation, (C. C. A. 2, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 942; Robert
Hind, Ltd. v. Silva, (C. C. A. 9, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 74; Jordan v. Brady
Transfer & Storage Co., (1939) 226 Iowa 137, 284 N. W. 73; Serr v. Biwabik
Concrete Aggregate Co., (1938) 202 Minn. 165, 278 N. W. 355, 117 A. L. R.
1009; Poti v. New England Road Machinery Co., (1928) 83 N. H. 232, 140
At. 587.
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if the plaintiff alone knows of the report and the defendant is uninformed of it, the mistake is unilateral and no cases have been
found granting relief in such circumstances. In all of these cases
the plaintiff is justified in relying on the statement in the absence
of unusual circumstances.
Equal or greater reliance is justified where the claimant has
been examined by both defendant's doctor and plaintiff's doctor
and their opinions coincide.8 0 Logically the agreement of the two
doctors constitutes the greatest assurance of exactness and justifies
the fullest reliance, but jurisdictions permitting relief only for misrepresentation would be expected to deny rescission under such
circumstances on the ground that primary reliance is on plaintiff's
own doctor. If plaintiff's doctor makes a diagnosis of more serious
injuries than defendant's doctor, then in most instances there is
no reliance in fact."' Certainly in a minimum number of such cases
the plaintiff may rely on the defendant's doctor despite advice of
his own physician due to the greater reputation of the former or
some other unusual situation, 2 but the number of such cases must
be so small that a court is justified in denying reliance as a matter
of law. The decisions indicate greater reluctance to set aside a
release where the plaintiff has the advice of his own physician
and of his own attorney no matter what theory of relief the court
may take. 83 The logic of these cases is clear, for where the plaintiff
has his own competent advisors the area within which the defendant may practice imposition has been narrowly circumscribed
-after all the courts must be satisfied with substantial, not perfect,
justice.
8
oCases granting relief are: Southwest Pump & Machinery Co. v. Jones,
(C. C. A. 8, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 879; Tulsa City Lines v. Mains, (C. C. A.
10, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 377; Crane Co. v. Newman, (1941) 111 Ind. App. 273,
37 N. E. (2d) 732; Mix v. Downing, (1929) 176 Minn. 156, 222 N. W. 913,
(1930) 179 Minn. 351, 229 N. W. 319; Le Francois v. Hobart College, (Sup.
Ct. Ontario 1941) 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 200, aff'd (1941) 287 N. Y. 638, 39
N. E.
(2d) 271.
81
Toland v. Uvalde Const. Co., (1939) 198 Ark. 172, 127 S. W. (2d)
814; Douda v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., (1909) 141 Iowa 82, 119 N. W.
272; Fornaro v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., (1931) 182 Minn. 262, 234
N. W. 300; Yocum v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., (1933) 189 Minn. 397,
249 N. W. 672; Great American Indemnity Co. v. Blakey, (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 1002; Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Hawkins,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 112 S. W. (2d) 1107; Texas Employers Ins. Assn.
v. Arnold, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 114 S. W. (2d) 636; Eccles v. Union Pac.
Ry. 82
Co., (1891) 7 Utah 335, 26 Pac. 924.
Graves v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., (Comm. App. 1942) 138
Tex. 589, 161 S. W. (2d) 464 (chiropractor); Pierce v. Seattle Electric
Co., 8(1914) 78 Wash. 167, 138 Pac. 666.
3Sitchon v. American Export Lines, (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 113 F. (2d)
830, cert. den. (1940) 311 U. S. 705. See cases under in footnote 81 supra.
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VIII
CONCLUSION

Some attempt has been made to collect and classify a few of
the decisions setting aside settlements in personal injury cases.
Analysis of the opinions reveals no unanimity of result or reasoning.
Yet on the whole it is clear that most jurisdictions depart from the
rules governing ordinary contracts in order to grant relief in cases
of hardship with respect to releases executed in reliance on the
erroneous statements of a physician. Certainly symmetry of the
law cannot be demanded at the expense of justice and socially desirable results-for just such reasons the courts have built up a
special field of insurance law in defiance of the general principles
of contracts, basing the deviation on the unequal bargaining power
of the parties. Within the field of personal injury releases itself
special rules have been devised to deal with special situations.
For example, it is almost universally held that the party who is
seeking to avoid a settlement has the burden of proving the misrepresentation or mistake by a heavy preponderance of the evidence, but where a shipowner pleads a release as a bar to a seaman's claim for damages for personal injury, the cases hold that
it is incumbent on the shipowner to prove that the release was obtained under fair and equitable conditions.8 4 The law is flexible
enough to carve out special rules to fit exceptional fields. Logically,
Judge Stone's objections are valid, as he says, only so long as there
is no indication that releases of personal injury claims present
factual differences distinguishing them from other releases, thus
creating an exceptional field.
Whether such distinguishing characteristics exist obviously depends largely on the subjective approach. No one can quarrel with
Judge Stone's view on the matter, and he has respectable authority
with him. What are the social policies involved? There is the
interest of society as a whole in the security of transactions, which
4Garrett v. Moore-McCormack, Inc., (1942) 317 U. S. 239, 63 Sup. Ct.
246, 87 L. Ed. 239; Bonici v. Standard Oil Co., (C. C. A. 2, 1939)
103 F. (2d) 437; Sitchon v. American Export Lines, (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 113
F. (2d) 830, cert. de. (1940) 311 U. S. 705; Hume v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, (C. C. A. 2,1941) 121 F. (2d) 336; Stuart v. Alcoa S. S. Co., (C. C. A.
2, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 178; Spillers v. South Atlantic S. S. Co., (D. C. Del.
1942) 45 F. Supp. 2; King v. Waterman S. S. Corp., (S. D. N. Y. 1945) 61
F. Supp. 969; Premeaux v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (Tex. 1946) 192 S. W.
(2d) 138; Contra: Wilson v. McCormick S. S. Co., (1940) 38 Cal. App. (2d)
726, 102 P. (2d) 412. For an apparent exception with respect to an Indian
plaintiff, see Midland Valley R. Co. v. Clark, (1920) 78 Okla. 121, 189
Pac. 184.
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would lead us to uphold releases. From this comes the oft-repeated
maxim that the law favors compromise settlements. But that is no
more than a mixim and the law actually favors only "fair" compromise settlements. When one person is injured negligently by
another the law has long seen fit to make the negligent person
liable for damages. Yet in the long run society must foot the bill,
for during the period of incapacity the injured individual is more
or less unproductive. The defendant manages to shift his burden
to the public at large through insurance or, if he is a self-insurer,
85
he may do so through an adjustment of the cost basis of his wares.
If the burden is allocated to the plaintiff it is shifted to society in
modern times through unemployment compensation, relief and
private charities to the extent that such agencies compensate adequately, but to the extent that such compensation is inadequate
plaintiff bears directly a portion of the burden (though society may
bear a certain part of the cost in such devious ways as the decreased
productivity, etc., of plaintiff's children by virtue of inadequate
education or physical debility). If the defendant manages to limit
his burden through a release the public at large must pay the bill
directly through taxation or charity. It may 'be thought that by
virtue of the defendant's ability to shift the risk in less objectionable form he should suffer the reimposition of liability in every
instance of mutual mistake or misrepresentation. Yet such a result
hardly accords with our notions of fairness or the desire of the
business world for some security of transactions.
But this very result, if desirable, can be reached with justice
when the release has been obtained by the reliance of the plaintiff
on a doctor's innocent misstatement which is attributable to the
defendant. And it can be reached without violence to established
legal precedents since a majority of the courts and all of the commentators agree that innocent misrepresentation is a sufficient
ground for the rescission of a contract."6 The differentiation of an
action for deceit and a suit for rescission has already been attempted
in this article, but there is a further reason for granting rescission
of a release for innocent misrepresentation. This is the difficulty
of proving either fraud or negligence on the part of the defendant
or his doctor. Many times we suspect fraud or sharp dealing, but
there is usually no way to prove conscious misrepresentation by a
doctor except by his own testimony, and it is quite likely that he
8
sSee Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929)
38 Yale L. J. 584, 720.
8GThis is true only where the release contains no contractual limitation
of liability for' innocent misrepresentation. See footnote 25 supra.
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will be unwilling to confess such conscious error. It is also well
known that proof of negligence in a malpractice suit is virtually
impossible. This difficulty of proof, which is at the root of such
rules as res ipsa loquitur, is ample reason to give relief for innocent misrepresentation which is otherwise actionable.
Any argument premised on difficulty of proof is certainly not
applicable to instances of upsetting a release for mutual mistake
as to the extent of the injuries suffered. Of course, there can be
collusion between the defendant and the plaintiff's doctor, but
such situations must be so rare that our reasoning as to misrepresentation would be unsound. Where there is a general release from
all damages, claims, etc., arising from injuries received in a certain accident, relief must be predicated solely on our ideas as to the
public interest involved. 7 Certainly a strong case may be made
for requiring the entrepreneur to assume liability in view of his
ability to shift the risk more easily and fully than the injured party
and in view of the economic compulsion on the latter. To do so
logically the court must face the fact that releases are different
from most contracts. As to the merits of the case the plaintiff has
as surely and definitely been harmed by the mistake as by an innocent misrepresentation, and his unwillingness to depend on society
to care for him via taxation or charity is equally as great. Most
of the unworthy cases under both misrepresentation and mistake
s8
Howcan be eliminated on theories of reliance or materiality.
ever, if a court accepts this rule, it should do so in full cognizance
of its deviation from the usual contract rules and extend such relief
to other types of contracts only where the attendant circumstances
justify similar holdings. If this rule as to mistake is coupled with
some doctrine of disproportionately inadequate consideration, so
that there is factual reason to believe that the parties actually were
not contracting with significantly different unknown injuries in
mind, then there is enough injustice and sufficient guarantee of
trustworthiness to permit disregard of the broad language habitually
incorporated in releases.88
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For a case note approving broad relief for mistake see Case (1928) 26

Mich. L. Rev. 828. The annotated case is on theory really misrepresentation.

See also McClintock, Mistake and the Contractual Interests (1944) 28 Minn.
L. Rev. 460.
SSBenedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Sutton, (1939) 198 Ark. 699, 130 S. W.
(2d) 720; Tucker v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., (1926) 120 Kan. 244,
243 Pac. 269.

89The opinion of Judge Frank in Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines,
(C. C. A. 2, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 336, expresses very clearly the economic disadvantages under which seamen labor in settling their injuries. His reasoning
seems equally applicable to a majority of personal injury releases-basically
only the historical argument is different.
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Courts which believe relief is socially desirable should grant
such relief, not only where there is an existing unknown injury
but should go beyond that and give complete relief where the mistake is as to the seriousness of an existing injury. No doubt it would
be an unwarranted extension of liability to upset a release where
long after the settlement a known injury developed an infection,
but such cases are very rare. The more frequent instance outside
of failure to discover a completely distinct injury is an error in
estimating the seriousness of a known injury-by legal legerdemain
this is frequently called an existing unknown injury, but it is
preferable to call a spade a spade and to admit that relief will be
given where the seriousness of the injury was underestimated.
Certainly the patient is no more or less abused where defendant's
doctor states that there is a slight concussion when there is a definite
brain injury than he is where the doctor mentions only lacerations
of the face but there is also the same unobserved brain injury. If
the court fears fraud on the part of the claimant there are probably
more guarantees of trustworthiness in the former case than in the
latter since the original examination and discovery are at least
an indication of the causal connection between the injury and the
accident.
The rule that a person attacking a settlement must prove the
mistake or misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence or
a heavy preponderance of proof is so firmly settled in the law9"
except for seamen's releases that there is no reason to expect aiiy
change nor would any be desirable. One may doubt that instructions
as to the preponderance of proof have much effect on the average
jury, but to the extent that it does it should definitely be retained
as an additional safeguard.
This discussion has not included the question of Statutes of
Limitations or laches, 91 but the latter question might with propriety
9oChicago & N. W. Ry. v. Wilcox, (C. C. A. 8, 1902) 116 Fed. 913
("clear, unequivocal and convincing"); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Reid,
(C. C. A. 9, 1917) 245 Fed. 86 ("clear and convincing") ; Southwest Pump
and Machinery Co. v. Jones, (C. C. A. 8, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 879 ("clear, cogent,
convincing and indubitable") ; Fraser v. Glass, (1941) 311 Ill. App. 336, 35
N.E. (2d) 953 ("clear and positive") ; Saylor v. Clover Splint Coal Co., (1944)
297 Ky. 604, 180 S. W. (2d) 563 ("clear, unequivocal and convincing");
Blaha v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1930) 119 Neb. 611, 230 N. W. 453 ("clear
and convincing") ; McIsaac v. McMurray, (1915) 77 N. H. 466, 93 Atl. 115
("clear and convincing"). But see Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Sanford,
(1930)
182 Ark. 484, 31 S. W. (2d) 963 (mere preponderance).
91
Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation (1933) 31
Mich. L. Rev. 591; Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 875; Dawson, Mistake and Statutes of Limitation (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 481.
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be more freely raised in those jurisdictions following liberal rules.
However, in permitting laches as a defense it must be realized
that one of the distinctions between ordinary mercantile contracts
and releases of personal injuries is that the passage of time is so
much more significant in the market with its frequent price fluctuations and consequent changes of position than it is with releases of
personal injuries; however, in any case where a release has been
attended by a substantial change of position, use of the equitable
doctrine of laches is desirable.
No attempt can be made to indicate set rules to follow as to
expression of opinion by doctors, whether they be diagnosis or
prognosis, and such set rules might be a handicap in dealing with
an expanding scientific field. However, it is suggested that the
courts reorient their discussions of opinion, using as a point of
departure the question of reliability rather than any hard and fast
rules as to "opinion." Much can be said for the Arkansas rule granting relief wherever the doctor denominates as temporary an injury
which is actually permanent. At best this is only a rule of thumb,
however, and is not to be confused with a sound initial analysis of
the subject--only after a rule has been thoughtfully considered and
accepted can it be applied without discussion. Such a rule must be
flexible enough that it can be adapted to medical advance. What
the court must decide concerning medical prognostication is whether
this is the type of statement by which ordinary men (as well as
the particular plaintiff) regulate their affairs. It is submitted that
most people do rely on doctors' opinions, even prognosis; man, an
optimistic creature, wishes to believe that he will recover in the
shortest time specified. The date of recovery as predicted by a
doctor is reliable, and it is the basic bargaining item. If the prediction is qualified in a professional manner, that is, the doctor
indicates recovery in three months but calls attention to the chances
of complication entailing a longer convalescence, then the court
should analyze the underlying diagnosis-if the actual injuries
differ radically from the diagnosed injuries, and such difference
would require a more serious prognosis, then relief should be
granted as for any misrepresentation or mistake of fact on the
theory that the prediction implied a precedent diagnosis. On the
other hand if the underlying diagnosis is correct and the prediction
fits the diagnosis professionally speaking then there has been no
mistake or misrepresentation even though the more serious consequences eventuate. Furthermore, it is then true that the injured
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party has a clear picture of the possibilities and definitely bargains
concerning the possible risks-in the face of such a prediction the
court is justified in finding that the claimant actually bargained
concerning those unknown consequences (and even unknown injuries) covered by most general releases.
It is possible to urge that the court upset every release where
the consideration received is appreciably smaller than the damages,
but probably no court is prepared to go so far in view of the fact
that the parties may also be bargaining concerning the defendant's
original liability and also that the claimant must in some instances
advert to, and bargain concerning, unknown injuries and unusual
consequences of known injuries.92 Furthermore, such an extension
of the existing mechanisms of relief would probably be an unwarranted invasion of the security of transactions."
The ideas here discussed are intended only to show that a
special body of rules has grown up with reference to personal
injury releases. The attorney, doctor and litigant must realize
this fact, recognizing that the extent to which a particular court
will grant relief depends greatly on the past experience of its
judges. Many a judge will recall the unscrupulous efforts of certain
plaintiffs and their attorneys to avoid their freely assumed obligations-suh judges may be expected to accent "unlimited contractual competence" as did Judge Stone in Larson v. Sventek.
But "many another judge will advert to similarly .unscrupulous
"d~fehdInts and their attorneys and in particular will remember the
reprehensible actions of some claim agents. 94 Such a judge miy be
S9Chici oa& N. W. Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, (C. C. A. 8, 1902) 116
913;
Tulsa City Lines v. Mains,' (C. C. A. 10, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 377; Fed.
Mclsaac
.v...
urray, (1915) 77 N. H. 466, 93 AtI. 115; Marini v. Mut. Benefit
Hea1t & Accident Assn., ( R. I. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 193. In most of the
cased cited throughout this article the court has left to the jury the question
of,.whether or not the release was intended as a compromise of claims for
unknown injuries, but on strict theory' the interpretation .of the written

document
is for the judge.
9
30ne of the criticisms of this article will center on the weight to be
given to security of transactions. No doubt the reliance
interest is of importance, and the frauds perpetrated-by unprincipled claimants are many.
Certainly if the releasor is free to upset-releases for mistake or innocent
misrepresentation, the releasee should have similar rights. This is not a true
double-edged weapon, however, for most releasors, due to the economic compulsion stressed herein, will be judgment proof and will long ago have spent
any consideration received. Furthermore, the risks of upsetting a release are
tod great for the releasee-his action will have to be at law for damages
rather than for rescission. These many difficulties make it of slight consolation
to the
releasee that he has "equal" rights with the releasor.
9
-'Such a judge can take consolation from the fact that some legislatures
have recognized the hardships inherent in general releases. Calif. Civ. Code
§ 1542. "A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does
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expected to emphasize the modern limitations on freedom of contract, to call attention to the existing inequalities of bargaining
power and the known economic compulsions and to stress the
social interests involved from the plaintiff's viewpoint. It is only
to be urged that some just and workable principles capable of easy
and fair application be formulated so that litigants may anticipate
equitable and ascertainable treatment.95
not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the release,
which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the
debtor." It may be supposed that all states copying the California Code or
the original Field Code have such provisions. See North Dakota Civil Laws,
1913, § 5834. Berry v. Struble, (1937) 20 Cal. App. (2d) 311, 66 P. (2d)
746 practically construed the California statute out of existence. But see
Backns v. Sessions, (1941) 17 Cal. (2d) 380, 110 P. (2d) 51. Clark v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., (1917) 36 N. D. 503, 162 N. W: 406, L. R. A. 1917 E. 399.
95
No attempt has been made to analyze collateral medico-legal matters
such as the liability of the doctor for his erroneous statement, or whether
a release of the primary tort-feasor also releases the doctor for negligent
treatment aggravating the original injury. The majority of jurisdictions say
that it does release the negligent physician, but there is a minority espousing
the contrary rule. For interesting discussions and a number of citations,
see (1933) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 485; (1934) 8 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 209;
(1937) 15 North Car. L. Rev. 293. The chief complications arise from the
hvpertechnical differences between releases and covenants not to sue and
the factual question of whether the physician and the original tort-feasor can
be considered as joint tort-feasors.

